GCC–Kurdistan Region Relations: The Role of Iran–Saudi Arabia Geopolitical Rivalry

Abstract

The relationship between the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) and Gulf countries began after the fall of Saddam Hussein's regime in 2003. With Saddam's demise, Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries grew apprehensive about Iraq's future, shaping their interactions with the KRG based on Iraq's significance and role in their political and security calculations. The post-2005 era witnessed heightened regional tensions, driven by an unfavorable balance of power for the GCC, governance and security challenges in Iraq, and the predominant influence of Shi'a groups over Iraqi state institutions.

The Gulf countries' engagement with the KRI in Iraq can be delineated by two principal objectives of GCC foreign policy in Iraq. Firstly, Saudi Arabia sought to assert a substantial role in regional politics, particularly in post-2005 Iraq, in response to the escalating influence of Iran and Turkey in the region. Secondly, Saudi Arabia aimed to counterbalance Shi'a dominance within the Iraqi state by fostering equilibrium among Iraq's major factions. While the Sunni population exhibited weakness and division, the Kurds significantly influenced the country's political trajectory, especially from 2005 to 2017.

I will argue that the Iran’s growing presence in Iraq has emerged as the most significant factor of GCC-KRI relations. Consequently, Gulf states, especially Saudi Arabia, have sought to engage with the Kurds to exert pressure on both the Shia government and Iranian dominance. The GCC ties with KRI are intricately linked to the post-2005 policies of Iraq's political elite towards the Gulf countries. The GCC's engagement with the KRI primarily occurs during pivotal political developments and crises in Iraq, aiming to leverage Kurdish influence in Baghdad and assert a role in Iraq's domestic politics.